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Adisproportionate number of people who are phys-ically displaced in the context of development proj-ects are from minority communities. Most of them
are indigenous or tribal peoples. Development-induced
displacement can give rise to severe risks for the resettled
population. Forced relocation results in the disruption of
the relationship between the relocated community and
the natural, social, economic, and cultural environments
upon which its means of livelihood are based. The loss of
a people’s base threatens the continuity of its traditions and
practices as well as endangers its cultural survival. In addi-
tion, the conditions of the new locations often imperil the
physical survival of relocated populations. The vice president
of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples underscored
the destructive consequences of the displacement of Indige-
nous Peoples from their land when he stated: “Next to
shooting Indigenous Peoples, the surest way to kill us is to
separate us from our part of the Earth.”
Sociologists and historians have long argued that because
of its devastating effects on both the physical and cultural
existence of dislocated people, development-induced dis-
placement may amount to “developmental genocide,” “cul-
tural genocide,” or “ethnocide.” Legal scholars, on the con-
trary, have traditionally focused on cases concerning
conflict-induced displacement, such as forced dislocations
of people that occur in conditions of armed conflict or civil
strife. Only recently, some legal scholars have begun to
evaluate forced relocations in the context of development
projects through the perspectives of international law, in par-
ticular international human rights law. Referring to forced
dislocations, Professor of Law and Development at MIT, Bal-
akrishnan Rajagopal, has publicly raised concerns about the
practice of “ethnically targeted development,” and has
called for the international indifference toward the “violence
of development projects” to end. Rajagopal argued that the
result of development-based resettlement is often “a soft
form of genocide or crime against humanity involving sys-
tematic and deliberate destruction of ethnic, racial and
religious minorities and indigenous peoples.”
Given this recent concern about the implications of
development-induced displacement and the realization
that special legal protection must be made available, it
seems timely to determine whether the international pro-
hibition of genocide and ethnocide can curtail development-
based resettlement. This question is not strictly academic.
Rather, the question of whether forced relocation can
amount to genocide can be crucial in deciding whether vic-
tims of development-induced displacement have cases for
redress, in particular in courts outside their countries. For
example, if the case can be made that development-induced
displacement can under certain circumstances amount to
genocide under international law, then the victims could,
for example, seek redress in U.S. courts under the Alien
Torts Claims Act (ATCA) which grants federal district
courts original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States,” even when the case involves
acts perpetrated in another country by a non-U.S. citizen.
Forced relocations in the name of development also
jeopardize the survival of the host populations inhabiting
the territories where the displaced resettle. The Qinghai
Component of the China Western Poverty Reduction pro-
ject (Qinghai Project), which in 1999 and 2000 was subject
to an investigation by the World Bank’s Inspection Panel,
is exemplary. The Qinghai Project was challenged by a
Request for Inspection, inter alia, because of its severe social
effects. Under the original project design, approximately
sixty thousand ethnic Chinese were to be transferred into
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the areas outside
the TAR within historical Tibet. The settler infusion would
have adversely impacted four thousand local people, includ-
ing serious risk of escalation of ethnic tensions and conflicts
over resources. Concerns have been voiced that the Qing-
hai Project would weaken the Tibetan and Mongolian char-
acter of the area, and threaten the lifestyles and the liveli-
hoods of the Tibetan and Mongolian “host” communities.
Protection against the Extermination of an Indigenous Group
as a Result of Development-Induced Displacement through the
Prohibition of Genocide under International Law
The definition of genocide that is most widely accepted
and generally recognized as the authoritative definition of
this crime, inclusive for purposes of customary law, is that
adopted by the United Nations through the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 9 December 1948 (Genocide Convention). According to
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Article 2 of the Convention, genocide means:
any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
The forcible transfer or dislo-
cation of a group or its adult mem-
bers is not explicitly included in
the exhaustive list of acts forbid-
den under the Genocide Con-
vention. The Genocide Conven-
tion does not, however, restrict
the manner in which the acts listed
in Article 2 can be committed.
Rather, any means of carrying out
a prohibited action with the requisite intent to destroy the
group constitutes genocide. Therefore, the forced reloca-
tion of ethnic and racial minorities and indigenous groups
may, for example, meet the elements of the international
crime of genocide, if the dislocation is meant to inflict on
the group conditions of life which can extinguish the dis-
placed community. 
Numerous cases of development-induced displacement
of indigenous and tribal peoples, such as the forced reset-
tlement in 1981 of the Waimiri-Atroari, a native tribe living
in the state of Amazonas (Brazil), to make way for hydro-
electric projects, and the forced relocation of ten thou-
sand indigenous Kenyah and Kayan people from their
ancestral homes on the island of Borneo to make way for
the Bakun Dam, demonstrate the effects of forced reloca-
tion. Such effects, including the deprivation of livelihood,
resettlement on unproductive land, and the introduction
of diseases, often subject the displaced populations to life-
threatening conditions. Genocidal acts do not necessarily
entail the immediate destruction of a group, but can be part
of an overall plan which aims at the destruction of the
essential foundations of the life of a national, ethnic, racial,
or religious group. Hence, forced relocation into an envi-
ronment in which the security, health, dignity, and tradi-
tional way of living of a minority group is not secured, may
constitute genocide within the meaning of Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention.
The “Intent to Destroy” Requirement of Genocide (Mens Rea)
The essence of genocide is, however, not the actual
destruction of the group, but the intent to destroy it as
such, i.e., the mens rea of the offense. Although forced relo-
cation may have the effect of causing the extinction of a
group, it may not qualify as genocide under the definition
set forth in Article 2. The critical determination as to
whether forced relocation amounts to genocide is whether
the affected community has been forcibly dislocated from
its land with the requisite “intent” to extinguish the group.
The government responsible for forcibly relocating a vul-
nerable minority group will, however, rarely openly
announce that it intended resettlement to contribute to the
destruction of the people dislocated. Rather, states assert that
the displacement and the threats it poses to the resettled
group are unintentional by-products of a development pro-
ject with a legitimate public purpose, such as economic or
social development. The argument about genocide may,
therefore, collapse at this juncture. 
The argument would not collapse, however, if the Geno-
cide Convention’s “intent to destroy” requirement were to
be interpreted broadly, i.e., that either knowledge or a gen-
eral awareness of the likely con-
sequences of the enumerated acts
with respect to the immediate vic-
tims of forced relocations would
meet this requirement. Can one,
however, convincingly argue that
knowledge or foreseeability is the
correct standard of genocidal
intent? In other words, could the
forced displacement of a minority
community amount to genocide
absent purpose to exterminate the peoples relocated on the
grounds of their ethnic difference or “otherness”? If the
answer is in the affirmative, given that the effects of forced
resettlement, unless mitigated, are not only devastating but
easily foreseeable, almost any case of development-induced
forced dislocation of people belonging to ethnic and racial
minorities and indigenous groups would constitute geno-
cide, and would therefore be curtailed by the international
prohibition of this crime.
The Interpretation of Genocide as a Specific Intent Offense by
International Criminal Tribunals and United States Courts
Some commentators contend that genocide embraces
those acts whose foreseeable or probable consequences
are the total or partial destruction of the group without any
necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the act.
The stricter interpretation, according to which genocide is
a specific intent offense, has prevailed, however. In this
context, the case law on genocide of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which have been crucial in
defining the crime of genocide, is relevant. In The Prosecu-
tor v. Radislav Krstic, the ICTY dealt in depth with the ques-
tion of how to interpret the intent requirement. In Krstic,
the Trial Chamber invoked the preparatory work of the
Genocide Convention, the 1996 Report on the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of the
International Law Commission (ILC), the International
Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, as well as relevant case law of the
ICTR. The Trial Chamber found that the definition of the
crime of genocide required a “specific intent,” i.e., that
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genocide encompasses only acts committed with the goal of
destroying all or part of the group.
In its 1997 decision Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana adopted the same interpretation. This case
addressed the claim of genocide by an Indonesian citizen
and leader of the Amungme tribe against Freeport, an
American corporation that owned a subsidiary which oper-
ated open-pit copper, gold, and silver mines in Indonesia.
The plaintiff alleged that Freeport’s conduct resulted in the
displacement, relocation, and “purposeful, deliberate, con-
trived and planned demise of a
culture of indigenous people.” In
interpreting genocide as a specific
intent offense, the court in Beanal
relied on the 1995 decision of the
United States Court of Appeals,
Kadic v. Karadzic, which upheld
that specific intent was an element
of genocide. The Beanal court
found that a claim of genocide
was not sufficiently clear and that
the plaintiff should therefore be
given the opportunity to make a
more definite statement clarifying
whether he meant that Freeport
was destroying the Amungme cul-
ture, or whether Freeport was committing acts with the
intent to destroy the Amungme group. 
The question remains whether the prevailing interpre-
tation of genocide as a specific intent crime must necessarily
be followed. In considering the object and purpose of the
Genocide Convention, an argument could be made both
for the specific intent interpretation, and for the broad
interpretation of the intent requirement of Article 2. The
International Court of Justice observed in its 1951 advisory
opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, that the Genocide Convention’s
object and purpose is “to safeguard the very existence of cer-
tain human groups.” If the Convention seeks to protect
human groups’ right to existence, however, in the interest
of the most effective protection of minority groups from a
rights-based approach, one might make a case for a broad
interpretation of genocidal intent. 
Proving Specific Intent
Even if specific intent were the correct standard of geno-
cidal intent, however, governments cannot escape charges
for “development genocide” simply by invoking the absence
of intent to destroy the relocated group as a separate and
distinct entity. In cases in which ethnic and racial minori-
ties and indigenous groups are forcibly resettled in order
to free their traditional land for economic development, the
purpose of the displacement might be to further economic
development. A project may, however, have more than one
purpose, as demonstrated by the actions taken against
Paraguay’s Northern Aché population between 1962 and
1972. In this case, fifty percent of the Aché population was
killed to make way for development projects. Scholars have
characterized the factual situation as genocidal, despite
the fact that the Paraguayan Defense Minister denied the
requisite genocidal intent existed. 
Indeed, governments often use development-induced dis-
placement as a means of undermining disfavored minority
cultures. Indigenous Peoples living in remote areas of a
country are particularly vulnerable to practices of “ethnically
targeted development” because they are often perceived as
“primitive.” In practice, the real challenge will be to find an
“intent” to extinguish the resettled group qua group. How
can intent, for example, be proved if a development-induced
relocation lacks an openly declared objective to destroy
the group in its collective sense?
Commentators have drawn a
parallel to race discrimination
claims, and have argued that plain-
tiffs probably must prove intent
indirectly, by inferences from the
actions of the government. Both
the ICTY and the ICTR have fol-
lowed similar approaches, and
have asserted that the intent to
destroy a protected group can be
derived from certain facts, such
as political speeches or plans, or
other methods or actions which
are not part of the genocide itself,
but constitute part of the attack on
the group, or the objective cir-
cumstances or consequences of an act. One would, there-
fore, have to study the facts closely to discover an implicit
genocidal intent. In cases in which a long-term state policy
of annihilating a particular minority group exists, and in
which forced relocations support the country’s general
policy of repression toward a minority community, or in
which a country’s developmental agenda is specifically and
knowingly tailored toward the destruction, development-
induced forced resettlement could merit the characteriza-
tion of genocide. 
Proving intent, even if indirectly, will be difficult unless
a pattern of rights violations with the foreseeable result of
group destruction exists. In sum, according to the prevail-
ing interpretation of genocidal intent, the incident of
forcible dislocation alone will not suffice to establish that
genocide has been committed, even if the displacement can
be reasonably expected to result in the extinction of the relo-
cated group. Rather, further evidence would be necessary
to prove that a state, in forcefully relocating a particular
group, did not only want to take the land of the people, but
destroy the people as such. 
The Prohibition under International Law of Cultural Genocide
(Ethnocide)
Forced resettlement might fall short of interfering with
a group’s physical survival, but may still undermine its cul-
tural survival. Although physical destruction is the most
obvious method to extinguish a group, one may, as has been
conceded by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Krstic case
“also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful
The question remains whether the
prevailing interpretation of genocide as a
specific intent crime must necessarily be
followed. In considering the object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention, an
argument could be made both for the
specific intent interpretation, and for the
broad interpretation of the intent
requirement of Article 2.
Displacement, continued from previous page
continued on next page
17
eradication of its culture and identity resulting in the even-
tual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the
remainder of the community.” Development-induced forced
relocations often cause foreseeable, irreparable harm to the
cultures of peoples whose religious, economic, or social prac-
tices, traditions, and norms are based on the land from which
they are dislocated. Displacement often results in the dis-
integration of local cultures, the weakening of community
institutions and social networks, and the dispersion of kin
groups, resulting in the cultural destruction of the affected
group. The question therefore arises, whether in such cases
the displaced people can make out a claim for genocide pro-
vided that the cultural destruction was intended.
Some legal scholars argue that, although the framers of the
Genocide Convention considered
and then expressly rejected cultural
genocide, the notion of genocide
today covers not only the physical or
material eradication of a group, but
also the cultural destruction of a
group. In this context, one might
argue that the prohibition of cul-
tural genocide has at least ascended
to the level of customary interna-
tional law. A narrow definition of
genocide excluding the cultural destruction of a group still pre-
vails, however. In the Krstic case, the Trial Chamber con-
cluded that “an enterprise attacking only the cultural or soci-
ological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate
these elements which give to that group its own identity dis-
tinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the
definition of genocide.” Similarly, in Beanal, the court held that
genocide included deliberate acts which inflict on the group
conditions of life “calculated to bring about its physical destruc-
tion,” but did not purport to include acts which cause “dis-
placement” and “relocation” absent any physical destruction.
Regardless of the difficulty of proving the mens rea require-
ment of the international crime of genocide, a rights-based
approach to the protection against threats to the cultural
survival of minority groups appears to be more suitable
than a criminal law approach. The framers of the Genocide
Convention argued in a rights-based direction, and decided
to leave the explicit prohibition of cultural genocide to
future human rights and minority rights protections. In past
decades, significant advances had been made in the devel-
opment of the law on Indigenous Peoples’ rights, most
noteworthy through the standard-setting activities of the UN
and the Organization of American States (OAS). For exam-
ple, Article 7 of the 1993 UN Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains the explicit lan-
guage, “collective and individual right not to be subjected
to ethnocide and cultural genocide.” The Proposed Amer-
ican Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples con-
tains an explicit prohibition of forced assimilation, the
right to cultural integrity, and a prohibition of arbitrary trans-
fer or relocation of Indigenous Peoples without their free
and informed consent. Both drafts reflect growing aware-
ness for the special needs of protection of indigenous and
tribal peoples against activities that may result in the destruc-
tion of the culture or the possibility of the extermination of
an indigenous group. 
To date, no single human or minority rights treaty exists
which explicitly prohibits cultural genocide or ethnocide.
The lack of a specific treaty does not mean that international
human rights law currently fails to protect against the cul-
tural destruction of minority groups. The prohibition of cul-
tural genocide is encompassed in the right of members of
a minority group to culture as protected, in particular, in
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR). Logically, the destruction of a culture
is a violation of the right to culture.
Controversy remains, however, as to whether the right to
enjoy one’s own culture implies that a minority communi-
ty’s traditional way of life must be preserved at all costs. Even
among the members of the Human Rights Committee,
opinions diverge on this question.
This disparity is illustrated by the
individual opinion of Committee
member Nisuke Ando in B. Omi-
nayak and Members of the Lubicon
Lake Band v. Canada. In their com-
munication, members of the Lubi-
con Lake Band argued that the
province of Alberta had allowed
private oil and gas exploration
activities to threaten their way of
life. The violation was manifested
by the threat of destruction of the band’s economic base and
the continuity of its indigenous traditions and practices, thus
endangering the group’s survival as a people. Whereas the
Committee found a violation of Article 27, Committee
member Ando argued in his individual opinion that “the
right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood
to imply that the band’s traditional way of life must be pre-
served intact at all costs. Past history of mankind bears out
that technical development has brought about various
changes to existing ways of life and thus affected a culture
sustained thereon. Indeed, outright refusal by a group in
a given society to change its traditional way of life may
hamper the economic development of the society as a
whole.” A decade later, the Committee in its considera-
tions regarding the communication Länsman et al. v. Finland
argued that although a state may understandably wish to
encourage development, measures whose impact amount
to a denial of the right of a member of a minority to enjoy
his or her culture would not be compatible with the oblig-
ations under Article 27. The Committee contended, how-
ever, that measures having a limited impact on the way of
life of persons belonging to a minority would not necessarily
amount to a denial of the right to culture under Article 27.
Applying this argument to cases of development-induced dis-
placement, one would have to conclude that the right to cul-
tural integrity as protected under Article 27 of the ICCPR
curtails forced relocations which prevent the relocated
from sustaining their cultural life.
To date, the Human Rights Committee has not yet
decided a case of forced relocation as such. The Commit-
tee’s concluding observations with regard to Chile’s State
Report of 1999, indicate, however, which standard the
Committee is likely to use in such cases. In the observations,
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ecution because the TRC fosters the children’s total reha-
bilitation and social reintegration in accordance with Sierra
Leone’s obligation to “take all appropriate measures to pro-
mote physical and psychological recovery and social reinte-
gration of a child victim of . . . armed conflict,” according
to Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). The child combatant’s unique position of first victim
and then victimizer requires a special accountability mech-
anism such as the TRC. Such an approach also is consistent
with Article 40.3 of the CRC, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of using alternatives to judicial proceedings when
dealing with children who have violated the law, provided that
human rights and legal safeguards are respected. 
In pursuing the difficult task of determining the account-
ability of a child combatant, many experts argue that account-
ability would best be established through a non-punitive truth
telling process, a form of catharsis allowing the victim and
perpetrator to heal emotionally and psychologically. Experts
argue also that it would be unfair to hold children to the same
standards of criminal liability as adults who orchestrated armed
attacks and forced abductions of children. As such, truth
telling before the TRC complies with international human
rights standards in the CRC, and appears to be the most effec-
tive accountability mechanism for children.
Conclusion
The moral dilemma of holding juvenile offenders account-
able for war crimes is addressed collaboratively by the Spe-
cial Court and the TRC. The Special Court focuses on pros-
ecuting war criminals with the greatest responsibility, while
the TRC focuses on fostering national peace and reconcili-
ation. There is strong support from Sierra Leone for the pros-
ecution of juvenile offenders in order to comply with the
international obligation to punish perpetrators of human
rights and humanitarian law violations. The lack of prose-
cution, some argue, could perpetuate impunity and pose a
risk of similar abuses recurring in the future. In light of the
special circumstances of the forcibly recruited child soldier,
however, it appears that the RUF adult leaders primarily
qualify as “individuals with the greatest responsibility,” and
should therefore be targeted for prosecution. The unique
position of the child combatant, first victim then perpetra-
tor, would best be served by truth telling before the TRC to
facilitate effective social rehabilitation and reintegration.
At the same time, the TRC promotes national reconciliation,
which is essential for the population to heal after nine years
of armed conflict. 
* Ismene Zarifis is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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the Committee raised concerns about hydroelectric and
other development projects that might affect the way of life
and the rights of persons belonging to the Mapuche and
other indigenous communities, and concluded that “relo-
cation and compensation may not be appropriate in order
to comply with article 27 of the Covenant,” and that “when
planning actions that affect members of indigenous com-
munities, the State party must pay primary attention to the
sustainability of the indigenous culture and way of life and
to the participation of members of indigenous communi-
ties in decisions that affect them.”
Conclusion
It is questionable whether an overemphasis on the draft-
ing history of the Genocide Convention serves the Con-
vention’s purpose to protect the right to existence of minor-
ity groups. When interpreting genocide, should one be
guided by the realization that international law is not static,
but an evolving body of standards and directives that must
be interpreted and applied in a contemporaneous fashion?
Despite the encouragement engendered by the emerging
genocide approach toward development-induced displace-
ment, however, one must certainly be careful not to stretch
the law to make it fit one’s vision. Hence, the crucial ques-
tion to be answered is whether the concept of genocide is
adequate to deal with forced relocations in the context of
development projects that result in both the physical and cul-
tural extinction of an ethnic and racial minority and indige-
nous group. The concept of genocide is not quite adequate
to deal with the destructive consequences of development-
induced displacement of minority communities. In most
cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that
forced dislocations in the context of a development project,
including those leading to the physical or cultural destruc-
tion of a minority group, constitute genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention. 
The case law of the international criminal tribunals does
not support the application of the concept of genocide to
development-induced displacement either. The factual sit-
uations the tribunals have dealt with were fundamentally dif-
ferent from most cases of forced relocations in the context
of development projects. In the cases before the tribunals,
states and individuals accused of having committed the
crime of genocide set out to exterminate the members of the
particular victim groups simply on the grounds of their eth-
nic difference. Yet to prove that a government intentionally
uses development-induced displacement as a means to extin-
guish a minority group qua group will be a difficult, if not
impossible, endeavor. Whether forced relocations in the
context of development projects are referred to as a “soft
form” or “special category” of genocide, the apparently
insurmountable hurdle of establishing the elements of geno-
cide remains. One may argue that in cases in which an indi-
vidual is held liable for the tort of genocide and not the crime,
that in these cases the intent requirement might be less
stringent. With regard to protection against cultural geno-
cide or ethnocide, it remains to be seen whether the pro-
posed declarations by the UN and the OAS on Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, once adopted, will be used as standards
against which the practice of ethnically targeted development
in general, and of development-induced displacement of
minority communities in particular, are measured. 
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